

Claims

1. Method for checking a digital signature, involving a microcircuit (53) that can be connected to a data processing system (51), the microcircuit being designed to receive requests to check digital signatures from the data processing system, and to process these requests, a digital signature being
5 generated using a private key only known to a signatory entity and associated with a public key,

characterized in that it includes a step of storing a certificates table (5, 5') containing a digest form of at least one public key in a memory in the microcircuit (53), and a phase (2) of checking a digital signature comprising
10 steps consisting of:

- receiving (21) by the microcircuit the digital signature ($\text{Sig}(A_{ip}, M)$) to be checked and a public key (A_{1p}) in a pair of keys comprising a private key that was used to generate the digital signature to be checked,

- calculating (22) a digest form ($\text{Hash}(A_{1p})$) of the received public key,
15 and searching (23) for the calculated digest form of the public key in the certificates table (5, 5'), and

- decrypting (25) the digital signature using the received public key if the calculated digest form of the public key is located in the certificates table.

20 2. Method according to claim 1,

characterized in that it comprises a phase (1) of inserting a public key (B_p) into the certificates table (5, 5'), comprising steps consisting of:

- receiving (10) by the microcircuit (53) a certificate ($\langle R, B \rangle$) of the public key (B_p) to be inserted in the certificates table, and a public key (R_p)
25 from a certification entity that generated the certificate, the certificate comprising the public key to be added into the certificates table and a digital signature of the certification entity, generated using a private key belonging to a pair of keys including the public key of the certification entity,

- calculating (11) by the microcircuit a digest form ($\text{Hash}(R_p)$) of the
30 public key (R_p) received from the certification entity, and searching (12) for the calculated digest form of the public key in the certificates table,

- decrypting (14) the digital signature using the public key received from the certification entity if the calculated digest form of the public key is located in the table,

- extracting (17) the public key (B_p) to be inserted from the certificate if the decrypted digital signature is correct,

- calculating (18) a digest ($\text{Hash}(B_p)$) of the public key (B_p) extracted from the certificate, and inserting (19) the calculated digest in the certificates table.

3. Method according to claim 2,

characterized in that the phase (1) of inserting a public key (B_p) in the certificates table (5, 5') comprises the insertion in the certificates table of a pointer (8) to the digest of the public key (R_p) of the certification entity that issued the certificate ($\langle R, B \rangle$) of the public key to be inserted, so as to define a certification tree in combination with the inserted digest of the public key.

4. Method according to claim 3,

characterized in that it includes a phase (3) of deleting a digest ($\text{Hash}(B_p)$) of a public key (B_p) from the certificates table (5, 5'), consisting of deleting the digest of a public key to be removed from the certificates table, and deleting all digests of public keys associated with a pointer (8) indicating the public key (B_p) to be removed, from the certificates table.

5. Method according to one of claims 2 to 4,

characterized in that each public key digest entered into the certificates table (5, 5') is associated with a validity end date (7), and in that the phase (1) of inserting a public key (B_p) into the certificates table also comprises steps consisting of reading a validity end date of the public key to be inserted in the received certificate ($\langle R, B \rangle$), and entering the validity end date of the public key (B_p) to be inserted into the certificates table, together with the digest of the public key to be inserted, if it is earlier than the validity end date of the public key (R_p) of the certification entity read in the certificates table.

6. Method according to one of claims 2 to 5,

characterized in that each digest of a public key entered in the certificates table (5, 5') is associated with a usage counter (41) that is incremented every time that a digital signature is checked using the public key, and in that it includes deletion of a public key digest from the certificates

table when the usage counter is zero and the number of empty locations in the certificates table is less than a predetermined threshold.

7. Method according to one of claims 2 to 6,
5 characterized in that each public key digest entered into the certificates table (5, 5') is associated with a usage counter (41) that is incremented every time that a digital signature is checked using the public key, on a last usage date (42) that is updated every time that the associated usage counter is incremented, and in that when the number of empty locations in the
10 certificates table is less than a predetermined threshold, it also includes a step to select a digest of a public key to be deleted as a function of the corresponding associated values of the usage counter and the last usage date.

8. Method according to one of claims 1 to 7,
15 characterized in that the microcircuit (53) uses a predefined hashing function to calculate the digest forms of the public keys.

9. Method according to one of claims 1 to 8,
characterized in that it comprises a phase of inserting a root public key
20 (R_p) in the certificates table (5, 5'), this insertion phase being done by write processing controlled by a MAC calculated using a specific key in the microcircuit (53) and only known to a transmitting entity in the microcircuit.

10. Method according to one of claims 1 to 9,
25 characterized in that the digest of a public key memorized in the certificates table (5, 5') is obtained by calculating a digest of the public key associated with other information such as the validity end date of the public key, identity information and serial numbers, this information being transmitted to the microcircuit (53) every time that the signature is checked
30 using the public key.

11. Method according to one of claims 1 to 10,
characterized in that the digest of a public key memorized in the
certificates table (5, 5') is obtained by calculating a digest of the certificate
35 received by the microcircuit (53) when the public key is inserted in the

certificates table, this certificate being transmitted to the microcircuit every time that the signature is checked using the public key.

5 12. Method according to one of claims 1 to 11,
characterized in that the certificates table (5, 5') is stored in a secure
memory area in the microcircuit (53).

10 13. Card provided with a microcircuit (53), characterized in that it uses
the method according to one of claims 1 to 12.

 14. System for checking digital signatures, comprising a microcircuit
(53) that can be connected to a data processing system (51), characterized in
that it comprises means to use the method according to one of claims 1 to 12.